Navigating New Waters in the Horn of Africa: Ethiopia-Somaliland Port Agreement
Visual Credit: Ma He
To ring in the new year in Addis Ababa, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Somaliland’s leader Muse Bihi Abdi signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) regarding nautical access for breakaway state recognition. The MoU intends to grant Ethiopia a 50-year lease on a naval base for commercial and military marine operations and, in return, Ethiopia will assess Somaliland’s pursuit for recognition as an independent nation—the first time a state has intended to do so. The potential of the deal to reshape geopolitical allegiances in the Horn of Africa, the Western Indian Ocean, and beyond is particularly noteworthy.
Ethiopia, the most populous landlocked state in the world, serves as a key driver of growth for the Horn of Africa. On account of its disconnect from water, Ethiopia currently pays Djibouti over a billion dollars annually in port fees, which is an exorbitant amount of money for a country where nearly a fifth of the population relies on food aid. Under the new accord, Ethiopia will recognize the self-governing breakaway territory of Somaliland in exchange for nautical access in the Gulf of Aden and the implementation of a military base.
Map of the Western Indian Ocean (WIO) and surrounding states; The region includes Eastern African coastal states Kenya, Mozambique, Somalia, South Africa, and Tanzania as well as island states Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, and overseas French territories Mayotte and Reunion.
Both Ethiopia and Somaliland consider this agreement a win. Prime Minister Ahmed has stressed that its loss of naval access is an “existential matter” that subjects the Ethiopian population to a “geographic prison.” Ethiopia’s neighbouring states, each with their own geopolitical agendas, however, are under no obligation to grant Ethiopia convenient and inexpensive water access. In fact, they possess every entitlement to utilize their coastlines as leverage in dealings with Ethiopia, a significantly larger, wealthier, and more influential neighbour.
In a rather startling suggestion, Ahmed pondered the possibility of merging Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, and Ethiopia into a single, “very big” country, boasting abundant sea access. He proposed that this new colossal African state could become “another Russia, another China, another America” in the global arena. However, given the significant power and size differentials between Ethiopia and its coastal neighbours, such a union wouldn’t signify a mutual coming together, but rather a blatant colonial absorption by Ethiopia—serving the landlocked country’s geopolitical and geo-economic interests while stripping away all sovereignty from the absorbed nations. This publicly promoted proposal should raise significant concerns for anyone invested in fostering peace, stability, and development in the region.
Similar to Ethiopia, the port access agreement provides Somaliland's leadership with something they have been seeking for a considerable time: acknowledgment on the international stage. This thirst for allies and sovereign recognition has brought Somaliland to Ethiopia’s bargaining table. The development of an Ethiopian military base inextricably ties these nations together, allowing Somaliland to capitalize on its vital position in global trade in pursuit of more ambitious foreign policy. Somaliland can now settle into its newfound insulated “oasis of stability” in Ethiopia’s shadow, safer from its fairly tumultuous neighbourhood.
Somaliland, officially the Republic of Somaliland, is an unrecognized state with international acknowledgement as a de jure part of Somalia. In 1991, Somaliland separated from Somalia through a war of independence along primarily ethnic divisions. Since then, Somaliland has functioned independently, though facing substantial financial challenges and lacking access to global trade. The capital, Hargeisa, independently produces passports, circulates the Somaliland shilling, and conducts elections on a five-year term schedule. Some experts even consider the region to be among the “most stable” de facto states globally.
Somalia, which still considers Somaliland part of its territory, rejected the New Year’s Day deal and Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud signed a law nullifying the port agreement. The country perceives any acknowledgement of Somaliland on the global stage as a direct assault on Somali sovereignty and territorial integrity. A government statement reads, “The Federal Government of Somalia views this as a hostile move that … constitutes a blatant transgression and intrusion into the independence, sovereignty and territorial independence of the Federal Republic of Somalia.” Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu, has also since withdrawn their ambassador from Ethiopia to hold extensive “deliberations” on the issue, stating the signed agreement would increase tension and endanger stability in the Horn of Africa.
This partnership will undoubtedly define politics and economics in the region moving forward. Djibouti, Eritrea, and Somalia will see a sharp decline in their influence over Ethiopia, unable to leverage port access in exchange for other warrants. This deal grants Ethiopia access to the Red Sea and Suez Canal, thus giving it unbridled entry to European trade. Ethiopia enjoying direct and near-permanent access to the Western Indian Ocean ensures that, at least for now, Ahmed’s aspirations for the state’s growing influence remain very much viable.
This access agreement between Ethiopia and Somaliland marks a pivotal moment with far-reaching implications for the Horn of Africa. While it provides Ethiopia with crucial sea access and recognition for Somaliland, it stirs tensions with Somalia, challenging notions of sovereignty and independence. This partnership surely alters regional power dynamics and underscores Ethiopia's growing influence. As geopolitics in the Western Indian Ocean evolve, the ramifications of this agreement will undoubtedly shape the region's trajectory for years to come.
Cordelia (she/her) is a third-year Political Studies student and one of Political Digest’s Editors-in-Chief.
